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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the alleged unfolding of ‘democracy without choices’ in Eu-
rope and its consequences for the quality of national democracies, particularly those of the Eurozone 
periphery (GIIPS – Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). The argument is, in a nutshell, that the 
lack of responsiveness of GIIPS national Governments to their respective national constituencies is the 
reverse of the medal of an excess of responsiveness in core Euro countries, particularly Germany. 
Governments are trapped between the pressure to be responsive at home and the need to be responsi-
ble to their European partners and the European project. If the trade-off of all democratic politics is 
between responsiveness and responsibility, Euro core countries have clearly opted for responsiveness 
(to domestic constituencies) and Eurozone peripheral countries have been forced to be responsible 
(towards their EU partners and the EU as a whole). As a result, the 2008 financial crisis has led to a 
three-fold breach inside the EU between core and periphery concerning the pace of economic recov-
ery, the degrees of governmental autonomy and, most important of all, democratic legitimacy. Euro-
zone peripheral countries are at the losing side of this three-fold breach. 
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1. Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to analyze 
the alleged unfolding of ‘democracy with-
out choices’ in Europe and its consequenc-
es for the quality of national democracies, 
particularly those of the Eurozone periph-
ery (GIIPS – Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portu-
gal and Spain). Governments in the Euro-
zone periphery are adopting a set of eco-
nomic policies (the so-called austerity pro-
gramme) that a majority of citizens reject 
and punish at the ballot box. Alternation in 
office, however, is not producing policy 
change. Upon taking office, former opposi-
tions are implementing the very same (or 
very close) unpopular policies that caused 
the fall of the previous government. There-
fore, threat of electoral punishment does 
not work as it should according to demo-
cratic theory, namely as a deterrent against 
unresponsive governmental action. 
The view from the periphery, among na-
tional publics and elites alike (including 
national Governments attempting to elude 
responsibility), is that national Govern-
ments, as members of the European Union 
and the Eurozone, have no choice but to 
implement the austerity programme im-
posed on them by a combination of non-
elected European institutions, creditor 
member states and international markets. 
The final implication of this argument is 
that national Governments lack policy au-
tonomy and this, in turn, necessarily brings 
about an absence of policy alternatives. 
Therefore, although people vote they do 
not really get to choose.  
The view from Eurozone core countries, 
particularly Germany, reflects the other 
side of the coin of the Euro-crisis. Accord-
ing to this view, all EU member-states 
have been subject to the same rules of the 
game, democratically legitimized at the 
national level by either referendum or par-
liamentary ratification, and have been hit 
by the same financial crisis. The difference 
between countries is that some had done 
their homework (in terms of structural and 
economic reforms) previous to the out-
break of the crisis while others had used 
the Euro years to spend beyond their 
means by way of unsustainable levels of 
public and private debt. Therefore, the ab-
sence of economic policy alternatives that 
GIIPS countries now face is a self-inflicted 
consequence of previous irresponsible (and 
even fraudulent, in the Greek case) behav-
iour. Helping GIIPS countries out of their 
self-inflicted debt crisis risks institutional-
ising moral hazard or, in other words, a 
carte blanche for each member state to 
behave as it pleases with disregard to the 
consequences. In order to avoid moral haz-
ard, core countries argue, debt-ridden 
countries that want help have to do their 
homework. There is no alternative to aus-
terity.  
The TINA (“There Is No Alternative”) 
predicament is common to both –core and 
periphery– views, but it is attributed to 
opposite causes. For the periphery, TINA 
is an external foreign imposition; for the 
core, TINA has been self-inflicted. The 
political consequences of maintaining one 
or the other point of view are not trivial. 
According to the periphery, responsibility 
for the present dramatic situation lies with 
core countries and EU institutions; accord-
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ing to the core, responsibility is all on the 
side of the GIIPS countries themselves.  
The problem with the view from the periph-
ery is not so much what it says, for it is true 
that GIIPS populations do not really get to 
choose the economic policy that they prefer, 
but rather what it omits. National Govern-
ments have a dual role to play in the EU: as 
founding member states severally and as 
member states jointly (Van Middelaar 
2013). As member states severally, national 
Governments represent –and are accounta-
ble to– their respective national publics and 
their main objective is the defence of na-
tional interests; as member states jointly, 
they have the responsibility to bring to the 
joint table (the European Council) the ac-
quiescence of their respective national pop-
ulations or parliaments to the decisions 
adopted jointly. In other words, EU national 
Governments wear two hats, one on behalf 
of their respective states and one on behalf 
of Europe (Van Middelaar 2013).  
Back home, however, GIIPS Govern-
ments are often tempted to show only one 
hat, that of the nation-state, thereby 
avoiding assuming responsibility for 
what they do when they wear their other 
–European– hat. They declare themselves 
impotent, economic policy being im-
posed on them by Brussels and their EU 
partners, failing to acknowledge the part 
they have played in such result. GIIPS 
national Governments have autonomy to 
decide, if only because they retain the 
utmost expression of sovereign power, 
their ability to abandon the club1. More-
                                                 
1 According to article 50 of the European Union 
Treaty (also known as Treaty of Lisbon, 2007), 
“any Member State may decide to withdraw from 
over, they can also attempt to block in 
extremis inter-governmental resolutions 
in case of “threats to life and limb” (Van 
Middelaar 2013). If GIIPS national Gov-
ernments do not do it is because they 
need to assume responsibility for deci-
sions taken jointly by the European 
Council or else they run the risk of being 
left out of the negotiating table. During 
the Euro crisis, GIIPS national Govern-
ments saw the need to be part of the Eu-
ropean Council negotiating table, but 
they did not take full responsibility for it. 
Back home, they neither said why they 
needed to be there nor did they ask their 
populations whether they still wanted to 
be there. Instead, they showed only their 
national hat and presented the TINA pre-
dicament as an imposition from outside. 
The problem with the view from the core 
countries is, again, not so much what it 
says but what remains untold. As in the 
case of GIIPS countries, core countries 
do not show their populations what they 
do when they wear the European hat and, 
therefore, do not assume responsibility 
for their joint actions with GIIPS at the 
EU level. Whether GIIPS did what they 
did encouraged by a faulty Euro design 
that was jointly decided by all member 
states and with the core countries’ acqui-
escence or, at least, with their looking the 
other way, is not discussed by Eurozone 
core countries back home and, therefore, 
not assumed. The decision to frame mor-
al hazard as a fundamental problem ex-
actly in 2010, after ten full years of col-
lective free-riding over EMU rules, was a 
                                                                       
the Union in accordance with its own constitutional 
requirements”. 
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political one, driven by domestic, not 
European, interests. 
The unfolding of ‘democracy without 
choices’ in Europe is widely interpreted as 
the victory of economics over politics, of 
technocrats over elected politicians. Here-
in, however, lays a paradox: how can we 
explain the heterogeneous effects of the 
same economic crisis across Eurozone 
national democracies if not as the result of 
political -not just technocratic- decisions? 
It is not economics that has produced the 
present situation but politics, and not just 
European politics but national –and na-
tionalist– politics pursued by EU member 
states in defence of their exclusive nation-
al interests. Admittedly, at present there is 
little discretion in economic policy for 
those national Governments which have 
been very badly hit by the economic cri-
sis, and this poses a major problem for the 
legitimacy of their democratic regimes. 
However, political autonomy at the na-
tional level is not completely absent. The 
EU is governed by its member states 
through inter-governmental negotiations 
and through membership of the European 
Council, not by the Commission or by the 
European Parliament. This means that a 
door is opened to nationalist responses to 
the economic crisis. In fact, EU member 
states have been acting with complete 
disregard to the level of interdependence 
among the Eurozone economies and the 
fragility that comes with it. Disregard has 
also extended to the level of interdepend-
ence of individual national responsibili-
ties. 
My argument in this chapter is, in a nut-
shell, that the lack of responsiveness of 
GIIPS national Governments to their re-
spective national constituencies is the re-
verse of the medal of an excess of respon-
siveness in core Euro countries, particular-
ly Germany. These are two sides of the 
same coin. The coin is the unwillingness 
on the part of national Governments to 
wear their European hat back home. De-
mocracies in the Euro periphery are being 
weakened and strained precisely because 
Euro core ones are flourishing under the 
application of austerity in the crisis-ridden 
countries. There is an illusion among the 
publics of core countries that the problems 
of the periphery are not their concern, that 
their national Governments share no re-
sponsibility in the unfolding crisis and that, 
consequently, they are not accountable for 
them. Given the huge economic imbalanc-
es inside the EU, it is impossible to be re-
sponsive simultaneously to two opposite 
and contradictory demands from below: 
the demand for austerity among the core 
countries’ populations, who suffer from 
bail-out fatigue, and the demand for fiscal 
expansion among the populations from the 
periphery, who suffer from austerity fa-
tigue. One of the two opposing constituen-
cies has to be prioritized and, in the pre-
dominantly intergovernmental world of the 
EU, it is the constituency of the most pow-
erful member state, Germany, the one that 
has the upper hand: the pro-austerity con-
stituency. 
Governments, being accountable to their 
national constituencies and only to them, 
are trapped between the pressure to be re-
sponsive at home and the need to be re-
sponsible to their European partners and 
the European project. The sovereign debt 
crisis has left some member states at the 
mercy of others precisely due to the ab-
sence of EU-wide constituencies and inter-
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ests or, lacking that, the presence of well-
designed and well-enforced inter-
governmental coordinating mechanisms. If 
the trade-off of all democratic politics is 
between responsiveness and responsibility, 
Euro core countries have clearly opted for 
responsiveness (to domestic constituen-
cies) and Eurozone peripheral countries 
have been forced to be responsible (to-
wards their EU partners and the EU as a 
whole). Prime Minister of Spain, Mariano 
Rajoy, bluntly expressed this at a press 
conference: “I have not fulfilled my prom-
ises but I have fulfilled my duty” (El País, 
13.2.2013). 
As a result, the 2008 financial crisis has led 
to a three-fold breach inside the EU be-
tween core and periphery concerning the 
pace of economic recovery, the degrees of 
governmental autonomy and, most im-
portant of all, democratic legitimacy. Eu-
rozone peripheral countries are at the los-
ing side of this three-fold breach. 
  
2. Democracy, choice and the autonomy of governments 
Democracy is about choice. Even so-
called minimalist conceptions of democ-
racy would make no objection to this: 
“Only voting that facilitates popular 
choice is democratic” (Riker 1982: 5). In 
the absence of choice between program-
matic alternatives, voting only serves to 
“ratify choices made elsewhere” (Prze-
worski 2010: 117). The very logic of elec-
toral competition encourages parties to 
offer alternative platforms at election time 
in the hope of maximising their votes. 
Even if the structure of competition is 
such that parties appeal to the median vot-
er, the logic of voting generally impedes 
that party platforms are completely identi-
cal (Downs 1957: 41-45). The responsible 
party government model is even more 
explicitly based on the idea that elections 
provide voters with a meaningful choice. 
Parties compete in elections standing for 
different policy platforms, voters choose 
between them and the party that gets 
elected carries out its mandate: “This con-
gruence between promise and perfor-
mance is at the heart of what we mean by 
‘democracy’” (Klingemann, Hofferbert 
and Budge 1994: 2). 
Choice in democracy does not belong ex-
clusively with elections; elected govern-
ments must also be autonomous to act up-
on their mandate by choosing among alter-
native policy paths (see Introduction in this 
volume). Downs’ economic theory of de-
mocracy presupposes a government that is 
“able to carry out the social functions of 
government” (1957: 21). In a similar vein, 
Dahl and Lindblom state that “[w]hoever 
controls government usually has the ‘last 
word’ on a question” (1953: 42). Writing 
in the mid-1950s, before the neoliberal turn 
of the world economy, Downs, Dahl and 
Lindblom were obviously thinking about 
domestic constraints on governments’ au-
tonomy. Economists and political scientists 
have since redirected their attention to-
wards the external constraints on govern-
ments’ autonomy. There are three main 
sources of external constraint: globaliza-
tion, the spread of neoliberal beliefs and 
supranational organizations.  
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Globalization changes the balance be-
tween the costs and benefits of diverse 
policy alternatives (Held 2000: 423) and, 
for this reason, it constitutes a major au-
tonomy-constraining factor (Rodrik 2011, 
Stiglitz 2012, Chang 2012). Economic 
policy is probably the area of government 
that has been most affected by the last 
round of internationalization of domestic 
markets. Globalization “reduces the extent 
to which democracy can pursue populist 
and highly majoritarian policies” (Ace-
moglu and Robinson 2006: 40). It "im-
plicitly excludes politics as an arena of 
choice” (Tony Judt 2010: 193). Market 
integration is thought to affect national 
policy autonomy through three basic 
mechanisms: trade competitiveness pres-
sures, the multinationalization of produc-
tion, and the integration of financial mar-
kets (Garrett 1999: 793). According to 
Garrett, the integration of financial mar-
kets is, of the three, the one that is more 
constraining on national policy options 
(Garrett 1999: 823). 
The power of globally integrated finan-
cial markets lies in the fact that “if the 
policies and institutions of which the 
markets approve are not found in a coun-
try, money will haemorrhage until they 
are” (Garrett 1999: 793). Stiglitz con-
curs: "The surrender to the dictates of 
financial markets (...) applies not only to 
those countries on the brink of disaster 
but also to any country that has to raise 
money from capital markets. If the coun-
try does not do what the financial mar-
kets like, they threaten to downgrade the 
ratings, to pull out their money, to raise 
interest rates; the threats are usually ef-
fective. The financial markets get what 
they want" (2011: 139).  
Thus macroeconomic stability becomes the 
absolute priority of national governments 
because, without it, governments will not 
find the money they need to carry out their 
policies. Until the 1970s, the objectives of 
macroeconomic policy were full employ-
ment or improving the quality of life 
(Mitchell and Muysken 2008, Judt 2010, 
Chang 2010, Arias and Costas 2011, 
Skidelsky and Skidelsky 2012). Now the 
objectives are short-term and less ambi-
tious: price stability, fiscal balance, market 
flexibility, balanced exchange rates.  
More autonomy-constraining than globali-
zation is the neoliberal idea that if econom-
ic policy is to be optimal it must be moved 
away from the temptation that elected poli-
ticians face to respond to the preferences of 
voters. This is what Friedman (2012) 
called the "Golden Straitjacket". There is 
an extensive literature in modern economy 
and political science that defends the need 
to insulate politicians from citizens’ de-
mands as expressed at the ballot box. This 
literature strand originated in the work of 
two Nobel-prize winners in economics, 
Kydland and Prescott (1977), and it has 
demonstrated that, under certain condi-
tions, it is socially optimal to restrain the 
policy discretion of elected officials. These 
works are behind many of the institutional 
reforms that modern democracies have 
experienced during the last three decades. 
Two are the basic mechanisms that have 
been used to isolate economic policy from 
citizens' demands. On the one hand, the 
establishment of fixed rules of behaviour 
that either limit or eliminate governmental 
discretion; on the other, the delegation of 
economic policy to public agencies inde-
pendent from political control, such as cen-
tral banks. Democratic politicians face a 
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trade-off between responsibility and re-
sponsiveness which, ultimately, refers us to 
the more worrying challenge of making 
capitalism and democracy compatible. 
The third, and probably the most, autono-
my-constraining factor is membership in 
the European Union because it combines a 
neoliberal institutional framework (fixed 
rules of fiscal policy and delegation of 
monetary policy to an independent central 
bank) with wholly integrated markets.  
To sum up, a well-functioning –
embedded– democracy is one in which 
citizens are offered clearly differentiated 
programmatic alternatives to choose from 
and in which governments have an effec-
tive power to carry out the policies for 
which they are elected. Moreover, in a 
well-functioning democracy it is “unlikely 
in the extreme that a government will long 
pursue policies that deeply offend a ma-
jority of citizens” (Dahl 1989: 223). If the 
external constraints on national govern-
ments’ autonomy were such that despite 
making clearly differentiated electoral 
promises elected governments would have 
to apply the same policies “citizens would 
vote but they would not choose” (Maravall 
2013: page?). In other words, if party plat-
forms are identical or if, upon taking of-
fice, parties are compelled to carry out the 
same policies that voters rejected at the 
ballot box something is amiss with repre-
sentative democracy.  
 
3. The EU 'Golden Straitjacket' 
The European Union is designed accord-
ing to the neoliberal belief that politi-
cians have to be protected against their 
primary instincts to be responsive to 
their constituents. This neoliberal ap-
proach suited well the interests of ex-
port-oriented member states, which 
were, understandably, wary of fiscal 
profligacy as it leads to real exchange 
appreciation and reduced levels of com-
petitiveness. The Maastricht world is 
“one of strict and impartial rules, a liv-
ing monument to the market-liberal wis-
dom” (Martino 2008: 267).  
The initial idea was that economic union 
would eventually lead to political union2 
                                                 
2 "Just as the Customs Union had to precede Eco-
nomic Integration, so Economic Integration has to 
precede European unity" (European Commission, 
Completing the Internal Market. White Paper from 
but somewhere along the process this ex-
pectation failed to materialize. The first 
and only attempt to establish a political 
union, the Constitutional Treaty signed by 
the EU member states in October 2004, 
was derailed by the populations of France 
and the Netherlands, who rejected it in 
referendum. Political union is still a dream. 
The mismatch between economic rationali-
ty and democratic politics led EU member 
states to an inconsistent institutional de-
sign: a monetary union without a fiscal 
union. The Euro is therefore “a currency 
without a state” (Panagiotarea 2013). Eu-
rozone national Governments have incen-
tives to prioritize responsiveness to their 
domestic constituencies rather than respon-
                                                                       
the Commission to the European Council, COM 
(85)310, 14 June 1985). 
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sibility towards their Eurozone partners 
and the EU as a whole. 
3.1 The only game in town 
Member states of the European Union have 
their fiscal and monetary policy autonomy 
limited through the use of two main in-
struments: the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) and the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) under the control of the European 
Central Bank (ECB). Fiscal policy con-
cerns state revenue and expenditure where-
as monetary policy deals with interest rates 
and the amount of money in circulation. 
Together, fiscal and monetary policy are 
the two major instruments of economic 
policy with which governments can tackle 
collectively desired objectives such as eco-
nomic growth and full employment. In this 
sense, they are among the most important 
things that governments get to decide upon 
and also among the most important worries 
in the lives of citizens. Inside the EU, mac-
roeconomic stability is 'the only game in 
town', even if socially costly3. 
Concerning fiscal policy, all twenty-seven 
member states are automatically members 
of the SGP. The main objective of the pact 
is fiscal balance. Governments should not 
be free to decide how much they want to 
spend and how much debt they are willing 
to incur. Instead, governments’ discretion 
should be limited by fixed external rules: a 
maximum budget deficit-to-GDP ratio of 
3% and a maximum sovereign debt-to-
                                                 
3 Article 3 of the Maastricht Treaty defines its guid-
ing principles as those of stable prices, sound public 
finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable 
balance of payments. Therefore, the state interven-
tionism implicit in article 2 (economic growth and 
high level of employment and social protection) is 
severely constrained (Moss 1998: 146).  
GDP ratio of 60%. Under these rules, na-
tional Governments lost a great deal of 
discretion in fiscal policy. Debt and deficit 
are not a free option for governments that 
want to spend money. The only real option 
to finding money once these limits have 
been reached is by raising taxes. 
The ECB sets monetary policy for all Eu-
rozone countries. The terms of functioning 
of the ECB are based on three tenets: inde-
pendence, a single mandate focused on 
price stability and a ban on the financing of 
EU members’ budgetary deficits (no 
bailout clause). The combination of an 
independent authority that sets monetary 
policy and membership in the Euro has 
several implications for national Govern-
ments’ policy autonomy. First, sharing the 
same currency is equivalent to having 
fixed exchange rates. Eurozone national 
Governments cannot engage in external 
devaluation in order to increase the com-
petitiveness of national products.  The pol-
icy instrument of the exchange rate there-
fore disappears. This implies that the only 
variable of adjustment to open competitive 
markets becomes wages. The expression 
used to designate policies of wage austerity 
is “internal devaluation”.  
Second, Eurozone national Governments 
that want to borrow money in order to be 
able to increase public expenditure, even if 
they want to do it within the limits of the 
SGP, have to do it in a currency that they 
do not control. If they want to borrow, na-
tional governments have to go to the open 
market and compete with businesses to 
obtain credit. This leaves Eurozone Gov-
ernments at the mercy of international 
markets. When things go well these con-
straints are too easily forgotten, as the ex-
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perience of GIIPS countries demonstrates. 
When things go bad, however, national 
Governments are forced to run an increas-
ingly large deficit until eventually inves-
tors lose confidence that they will be paid 
back. At this point the money will haemor-
rhage out of the country. Default, however, 
is not an option under EMU rules. 
Third, Eurozone national governments 
are subject to the same monetary policy 
irrespective of the conditions and neces-
sities of their national economies. This is 
what is called “one-size-fits-all” mone-
tarism. The ECB sets nominal interest 
rates valid for all the Eurozone econo-
mies. If the level of inflation is different 
across countries, which it is, real interest 
rates will vary accordingly, being lower 
for those countries with higher levels of 
inflation and vice-versa. It is impossible 
for the ECB to set interest rates at a level 
that is optimal for all the economies of 
the Eurozone simultaneously. The impli-
cation is that when Eurozone national 
Governments want to cool down an over-
heated economy, increasing interest rates 
is not an option.  
3.2 Room for manoeuvre  
The SGP and the ECB rules fix the terms 
within which national Governments can 
move. During periods of economic con-
traction, national Governments have lim-
ited autonomy to apply their own solutions 
to get out of the situation. But, to what 
extent do these rules really limit Govern-
ments' autonomy? In order to answer this 
question we need to know, first, to what 
extent are the fiscal limits enforced upon 
national Governments and, second, how 
reasonable these limits are or, in other 
words, how able are national Governments 
to cope with the type of economic situa-
tions that countries usually encounter 
without breaching these limits. 
Let us start with the enforcement of the 
SGP. In case of non compliance, the Euro-
pean Commission initiates an excessive 
deficit procedure (EDP) to force the na-
tional Government back into line. In prac-
tice, enforcement has been very weak. On-
ly one country has never breached the defi-
cit limit (Estonia), while another has done 
it continuously since 2000 (Greece). Only 
five countries have never breached the debt 
limit (Estonia, Finland, Luxembourg, Slo-
vakia and Slovenia) while four of them 
have continuously done so (Austria, Bel-
gium, Greece and Italy). Estonia is, there-
fore, the only country that has never 
breached either the deficit or the debt lim-
its set under SGP rules. Germany and 
France were among the earliest to breach 
the pact in 2001 and 2002 respectively 
(European Commission, Economic and 
Financial Affairs). The effort to punish 
France and Germany in 2003 came to noth-
ing, as Germany outmanoeuvred the 
Commission to avoid sanctions. This set 
the tone of future enforcing actions. Weak 
enforcement meant that autonomy re-
striction was a political decision rather 
than a technocratic one; it belonged to 
what Van Middelaar calls the “intermedi-
ate sphere of member states” (2013: 18) 
and their mutual power relationships, not 
to the “inner sphere” of EU institutions 
(Commission and Parliament). Enforce-
ment depended not just on a country's mac-
roeconomic situation (the technocratic de-
cision) but also on political considerations 
that fell outside the pact (the political deci-
sion). In sum, weak enforcement and soft 
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sanctions “rendered economic policy-
making ‘national’ and therefore susceptible 
to the usual political calculations” (Panag-
iotarea 2013: 163). This conclusion is rein-
forced by looking at Greece, an extreme 
case but by no means a unique one. Greece 
should never have been admitted inside 
EMU, for it did not fulfill the necessary 
conditions, and yet it was. The decision 
was clearly political, not technocratic. 
Keeping Greece in the Eurozone has re-
quired another political decision (Panagio-
tarea 2013: 8). 
Being constrained in their policy discre-
tion, therefore, is not equivalent to being 
totally devoid of choice. Weak enforce-
ment of fiscal rules has guaranteed, at least 
until 2012, a wide room for manoeuvre to 
national Governments, just as member 
states wanted it to be, since they had to 
respond to their national constituencies 
(Van Middelaar 2013). This is demonstrat-
ed not only by the diversity of trajectories 
of Eurozone economies during the years 
previous to the financial and economic 
crisis but also by the diversity of responses 
to the contraction of their economies. In 
reaction to the economic contraction of late 
2008 and early 2009, EU institutions could 
not do much in terms of fiscal stimulus 
since the EU itself, not being a fiscal un-
ion, has very little fiscal capacity4. The 
fiscal responses to the economic recession 
had to come, necessarily, from the EU 
member states. The absence of established 
institutional mechanisms of coordination 
meant that EU members followed their 
particular national interests and, as a result, 
there was no coordinated EU-wide re-
                                                 
4 The EU budget comprises roughly 1 percent of the 
EU GDP and the EU cannot issue debt except for 
very limited purposes and in very limited amounts. 
 
sponse to the economic recession (Camer-
on 2012, Schelkle 2012, Jordana 2013). A 
more coordinated action was demanded by 
French President Sarkozy but vetoed by 
the German Chancellor Merkel. All she 
was willing to accept was a “minimalist 
reconciliation of national measures so as to 
prevent negative side effects on each oth-
er” (Schelkle 2012: 146).  
Given the diversity of economic conditions 
and political willingness or ability to incur 
in budget deficits, national Governments 
used their policy discretion in different 
ways, some relying on active fiscal expan-
sion, others waiting for the automatic stabi-
lizers to kick in without intervention, oth-
ers applying pro-cyclical measures, and 
with different results (Ansell 2012, Arm-
ingeon and Baccaro 2012, Barnes and 
Wren 2012, Cameron 2012). Some coun-
tries abandoned the recession much earlier 
than others and with less social costs, 
thereby contributing to enhance the eco-
nomic imbalances inside the EU (Cameron 
2012: 124).  
The crisis led most European economies to 
breach the limits of the SGP. In December 
2009 there were twenty EDPs opened out 
of twenty-seven member states. Haunted 
by moral hazard and spurred on by Germa-
ny, the reaction of the European Council 
was to establish a new pact outside the 
treaty (and, therefore, an inter-
governmental pact), the so-called Fiscal 
Compact, which is stricter than its prede-
cessor, in the sense that it monitors coun-
tries much more closely, allows for auto-
matic enforcement measures against shirk-
ers and demands that all signing countries 
(the UK and the Czech Republic did not 
sign it) approve a constitutional law that 
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binds them to a policy of fiscal balance 
(Schuldenbremse or debt brake).  
The Constitutional debt brake was first 
approved in Germany’s parliament in Jan-
uary 2009. In late 2008 and early 2009, at 
the height of the economic recession in 
Europe, Chancellor Merkel had to struggle 
with opposition inside her own party be-
cause she had promised to lower taxes and 
public debt whereas now she was asking 
the parliament to pass fiscal stimulus legis-
lation. The Constitutional debt brake was 
the price that Merkel paid to get the neces-
sary consent by her back-benchers to Ger-
many’s second fiscal stimulus package 
(Schelkle 2012: 136). Chancellor Merkel 
insisted during the worst months of 2008 
and 2009 that the fiscal stimulus was only 
temporary and that as soon as possible 
Germany would go back to the right path 
of fiscal virtuosity. In order to make this 
more credible to her constituents and to her 
own party, Merkel used the EU institutions 
as a platform for her domestic electoral 
politics. She pushed the Constitutional debt 
brake upon all EU partners in the Fiscal 
Compact. This is one more indicator of the 
extent to which national politics have dom-
inated the member states’ positions at the 
European Council throughout the crisis. 
The Fiscal Compact was signed on 2 
March 2012 and entered into force on 1 
January 2013. The EU straitjacket was now 
tighter; national Governments’ autonomy 
has been further reduced, economic policy 
has been further removed from democrati-
cally accountable governments. Once 
more, this removal has been self-inflicted 
and, once more, it has been a political re-
sponse to an economic situation. As 
Schelkle has put it: “the reformed frame-
work abdicates power, reinforces economic 
pressures, and lets market forces dictate 
policy choices, even though they are mani-
festly counterproductive and inconsistent” 
(2012: 151). The Eurozone core countries 
do not feel the bite of the Fiscal Compact 
yet, as their economies are slowly recover-
ing from the economic shock, but one day 
they might. 
Most EU national Governments, at one 
time or another, have not found space to 
breath within the fiscal and monetary lim-
its of the EU, as demonstrated by the large 
amount of EDPs since 2000. It is not just 
a consequence of the financial crisis of 
2008, since the number of EDPs was al-
ready high before then. The Maastricht 
deficit and debt limits proved to have 
been too tightly constructed. Even the 
country most fully supportive of fixed 
fiscal and monetary rules, Germany, had 
to admit to their rigidity during the years 
that followed the signature of the SGP. 
But instead of going in the direction of 
designing more flexible rules or question-
ing the necessity of rules altogether, Eu-
ropean leaders are moving towards stricter 
rules and increased rigidity in economic 
policy (more technocracy, less autonomy 
for politics), and they are doing so for 
reasons of domestic electoral interest, not 
of economic rationality. 
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4. The sovereign debt crisis 
The introduction of EMU preceded eco-
nomic convergence among the EU econo-
mies and was not accompanied by a simul-
taneous fiscal union. As was to be ex-
pected, the monetary union not only did 
not eliminate the existing economic imbal-
ances already existing in the EU, but creat-
ed new ones (Scharpf 2011). Thus, when 
the financial and the economic crisis hit the 
EU countries at the end of 2008, the large 
variation of discretionary fiscal responses 
only served to accentuate, rather than sof-
ten, the economic imbalances between 
countries already at play. 
4.1 Core-periphery divergence be-
fore 2008 
The story is well known and has been told 
many times. During the 1990s and the first 
part of the 2000s economic growth in the 
Eurozone periphery mainly came from the 
expansion of private consumption financed 
by rising private (and public, in Greece) 
sector indebtedness. Credit was cheap as 
real interest rates in GIIPS economies were 
very low compared to those in core Euro-
zone economies. What was supposed to be 
a conservative monetary policy imposed on 
countries by the ECB became de facto an 
expansionary monetary policy in GIIPS 
countries given the heterogeneity of eco-
nomic conditions within the Eurozone5. In 
Spain and Ireland, this cheap credit fi-
nanced a real-state bubble that pushed up-
wards economic growth, together with 
                                                 
5 Average real interest rates between 1996-2007 in 
Germany (3.9%), Finland (3.4%), Austria (3.5%) or 
France (3%) were much higher than in Greece 
(2.3%), Portugal (1.8%) or Spain (1.4%). 
 
employment, per-capita incomes and pric-
es. In Greece, public debt was used for 
fiscal expansion policies. Real wages and 
unit labour costs increased accordingly, 
resulting in growing imports and decreas-
ing competitiveness and augmenting the 
gap between core and periphery.  
The money for all this borrowing came, on 
the one hand, from Eurozone core coun-
tries with a surplus, predominantly from 
Germany, a country which was generating 
a considerable surplus through the gov-
ernment’s policy of internal devaluation 
and of keeping domestic demand low in 
order to push exports, and, on the other 
hand, from the international financial mar-
kets. Financial markets systematically 
overestimated the creditworthiness of Eu-
rozone peripheral economies (Arghyrou 
and Tsoukalas 2010, Lavapitsas et al. 
2010, Leao and Palacio-Vera 2011, Panag-
iotarea 2013). GIIPS Governments also 
underestimated the risks of the policy they 
were pursuing; membership in the Euro 
gave them a false sense of security. 
GIIPS Governments could neither cool 
down aggregate domestic demand by rais-
ing interest rates nor ease the losses of 
competitiveness through currency devalua-
tion, since these decisions belonged to the 
ECB. This means that membership in the 
Eurozone severely limited the GIIPS Gov-
ernments’ policy autonomy. For all the 
above reasons, GIIPS economies were par-
ticularly vulnerable to the 2008 financial 
crisis, a trait that they shared with other EU 
countries, such as for example UK. What 
was different between the UK and the 
GIIPS was Euro membership. Outside the 
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rigidities of the Euro, the stories of the 
GIIPS economies would have looked much 
more like that of the UK (Armingeon and 
Baccaro 2012). 
Admittedly, GIIPS Governments could 
have made better use of the autonomy they 
had during the period of economic growth 
that preceded the 2008 financial crisis. As 
Scharpf has rightly pointed out, the politi-
cal crash programs implemented in the 
European peripheries in order to converge 
on the Maastricht criteria “had generally 
not addressed the underlying structural and 
institutional differences that had originally 
caused economic divergence” (Scharpf 
2011: 12). The problem, however, has not 
been one of fiscal profligacy in all GIIPS 
countries, as it is commonly framed by 
politicians and mass-media in Eurozone 
core countries. Ireland and Spain had been 
running budget surpluses since 2003 and 
2005, respectively, and public debt levels 
had been kept below 60% since the estab-
lishment of the Euro. Portugal had equally 
low levels of public debt. The fiscal profli-
gacy story only fits Greece and Italy alt-
hough, all too willingly, it has been applied 
to all GIIPS economies. Being fiscally vir-
tuous, however, has saved neither Ireland 
nor Spain from needing to be bailed-out. 
4.2 Austerity kicks in 
The initial response to the financial melt-
down and subsequent economic crisis in 
advanced developed economies was to 
apply anti-cyclical policies in the form of 
expansionary fiscal packages. The excep-
tions are Ireland and Greece (Bermeo and 
Pontusson 2012). Keynesianism did not 
last long in Eurozone countries. Among 
those countries engaging in active fiscal 
expansion packages was Germany. Fiscal 
expansion, however, meant going against 
the electoral promises of the German gov-
erning coalition of CDU-CSU and FDP. 
For this reason, after one year of fiscal 
expansion, it was imperative for Germa-
ny’s electoral politics to return to fiscal 
virtuosity. This is when the Greek debt 
crisis came to help German electoral poli-
tics. In October of 2009, immediately after 
PASOK’s landslide victory in the Greek 
elections, the new finance minister Papa-
constantinou said that the budget deficit 
would jump to 12.5% of GDP at the end of 
the year, more than double the previous 
government’s forecast. 
This is precisely when orthodoxy over aus-
terity kicked in. Following the discovery 
that Greece had been using false statistics, 
the Economic and Financial Affairs Coun-
cil (EcoFin) imposed a radical budgetary 
adjustment program in February 2010. The 
‘austerity’ policy package consisted of a 
combination of fiscal balance, wage cuts, 
and structural reforms aimed at producing 
an internal devaluation of GIIPS countries 
vis-à-vis the Eurozone core economies. 
Obedient to the EcoFin, in early February 
the Greek Government announced an aus-
terity package that was expected to bring 
down the deficit to 3% of GDP in 2012. A 
month later, as S&P sank Greece’s sover-
eign debt rating to BBB+, Prime Minister 
Papandreou called on EU partners to help 
Greece. Meanwhile, Greece’s 10-year 
bond yield had jumped to 9.68%. In May 
Eurozone members agreed on a 110 bil-
lion-euro rescue loan for Greece at market 
interest rates (Euribor). In exchange, the 
Greek government committed itself to 30 
billion Euros in austerity cuts over the fol-
lowing three years. When the Greek Par-
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liament approved the austerity package on 
6 May 2010, the 10-year bond yield had 
reached the dramatic and unsustainable 
level of 12%. Obviously, the financial 
markets did not see the EU loan as a solu-
tion to Greece's problems, and even less as 
a guarantee that Greece would be able to 
repay its debts. At this point, the ECB de-
cided to intervene by buying Greek bonds 
in the secondary market in order to in-
crease confidence and lower bond yields. 
This is the only thing that put a stop to the 
skyrocketing Greek bond yields, but only 
for a few weeks. In December 2010 the 
yield reached a new highest level, at 
16.3%, and in September 2011 it was at 
26.4%. As Schelkle has put it, “[t]o ask the 
Greek government to do the democratically 
impossible did not exactly calm nervous 
markets” (2012: 147).  
The Greek crisis soon infected the rest of 
the most fragile Eurozone economies. Ire-
land and Portugal had been applying aus-
terity since the outbreak of the financial 
crisis but this fact did not protect them 
against an intervention a few months after 
the Greek one. Spain moved 180 degrees 
from fiscal expansion to austerity in May 
2010, following the first Greek crisis, in an 
announcement that would cost Prime Min-
ister Zapatero his political career. As with 
Ireland and Portugal, however, austerity 
would not save Spain from falling into 
disgrace with the markets.  
In contrast to Greece, Ireland and Portugal, 
the Spanish and Italian economies were 
'too big to be rescued'. Therefore the ECB 
decided to be proactive and to use the 
strategy of the carrot and the stick. In alli-
ance with the Spanish and Italian Central 
Banks, the ECB sent a secret letter to the 
Spanish and Italian Governments with a 
proposition: if they did as they were told 
(the stick), the ECB would in turn alleviate 
the pressure by a massive purchase of Ital-
ian and Spanish bonds in the secondary 
market (the carrot, not explicitly stated) 6. 
The ECB knew this would stop immediate-
ly the speculation against the Italian and 
Spanish sovereign debts as it had been the 
only measure that had worked with Greece. 
The bond-buying program of the ECB, and 
the open window of liquidity to banks, 
benefited peripheral countries and prevent-
ed the euro from falling apart7.  
The argument in favour of austerity run as 
follows: GIIPS were having difficulties to 
borrow money in the global markets be-
cause markets did not have confidence in 
the capacity of GIIPS to repay their debts. 
In order to regain confidence, GIIPS had to 
demonstrate their willingness to be ‘virtu-
ous’ by eliminating their deficits, reducing 
public debt, cutting wages in order to be 
competitive and engaging in structural re-
forms. Only then would confidence be re-
stored and would GIIPS be able to find 
buyers for their bonds. The fact that strong 
pro-cyclical fiscal policies in this context 
could trigger a spiral of recession 
(Krugman 2009, Stiglitz 2010, Scharpf 
2011, Cameron 2012) was conveniently 
                                                 
6 In contrast to Spain, where it was never made 
public, the letter in Italy did not remain secret for 
long. It was leaked to the press and published by 
Corriere della Sera. We know that the contents of 
the letter to the Spanish government were the same 
thanks to the testimony of Guindal (2012). 
7 The ECB did this against the criterion of the Ger-
man Bundesbank thereby demonstrating that it was 
not possible to have just one monetary policy for 
very different countries. The bond-buying program 
was de facto an unorthodox way of deploying 
asymmetrical monetary mechanisms for an asym-
metric monetary union. 
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forgotten by austerity mongers although 
reality proved stubborn and the spiral of 
recession soon made its presence. 
Despite enormous efforts in the direction 
of virtuosity, the markets continued to mis-
trust GIIPS’ bonds after the bailouts and to 
demand high yields for the acquisition of 
Eurozone peripheral sovereign debt while 
simultaneously taking refuge in bonds 
from Eurozone core countries, particularly 
German ones. Thus while Germany and 
other core countries could borrow very 
cheap GIIPS Governments had to refinance 
the old debt into new debt at much larger 
interest. Being aware of this, financial 
markets' confidence in the capacity of 
GIIPS economies to repay their debt was 
even further reduced. Austerity was gener-
ating the opposite results of those for 
which it was intended. GIIPS economies 
continued to suffer an economic recession 
and soaring fiscal deficits and debt. Greece 
needed a second 'rescue package' in the 
summer of 2011, again conditional on ap-
plying a new set of austerity measures and 
economic reforms. Since the country was 
plunging further into recession, there was 
no growth with which to repay debts and 
new debts accumulated on top of old ones. 
The Spanish financial sector had to be 
bailed-out too. Even if GIIPS economies 
could be able to eventually create a large 
enough primary surplus through internal 
devaluation policies to repay their debts, 
GIIPS democracies would find it impossi-
ble, since the social costs would be simply 
too high.  
When a Eurozone country can no longer 
borrow in the international bond markets, 
and it is neither willing nor allowed by its 
club partners to default on its debt, austeri-
ty is the only option, since it is the only 
policy that the lenders will accept as condi-
tion for their loan. Anyone who has read 
the Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) 
signed by debtor countries and their credi-
tors (the so-called Troika: the EU member 
states as represented by the European 
Commission, the ECB and the IMF) under-
stands that these agreements have replaced 
party manifestos as the roadmaps of policy. 
They specify the country's economic policy 
in great detail. The MoUs are contracts that 
bind future elected governments. If coun-
tries do not do as they are told they will not 
get the money they need which, on the 
other hand, is increasingly dedicated to the 
payment of debt interests and not to the 
running of their states. GIIPS citizens vote 
in elections but do not get to choose among 
alternative economic policies because eco-
nomic policy has already been determined 
by the MoU contract. The Prime Minister 
of Spain, Mariano Rajoy, bluntly admitted 
that much to the Spanish parliament on 10 
July 2012: “We Spaniards cannot choose, 
we do not have the freedom to do so” (El 
País, 11.7.2012). What he did not say is 
that although there is no alternative within 
the framework of the MoU and the EMU, 
nothing and nobody is limiting national 
Governments' ability to mobilize support, 
both at home and among its EU partners, 
against the orthodoxy of austerity and in 
favour of a complete renegotiation of the 
EMU pact. For some reason, they have 
chosen not to do so. 
The TINA predicament is only valid –and 
only credible– within the rigid walls of 
EMU. However, the EMU rules are no 
more sacred than any other previous set of 
rules that the EU members have given 
themselves and then decided to change in 
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order to move forward the European pro-
ject. All policy alternatives must necessarily 
deal head on with the fiscal and monetary 
rules of EMU. The distributional issues 
between debtors and creditors that lie at the 
bottom of the sovereign debt crisis need to 
be acknowledged and dealt with explicitly. 
GIIPS Governments are focusing on rene-
gotiating the MoU, trying to extend the 
deadlines of compliance but conscious that 
compliance means, even with more flexible 
deadlines, the loss of at least one generation 
in their respective countries. The choice that 
exists, therefore, does not concern alterna-
tive economic policies, since there is only 
one alternative on the table under EMU 
rules. It rather concerns whether to accept 
the rules of the game or to renegotiate them. 
The choice is again of a political, not eco-
nomic, nature and of fundamental conse-
quence for the future of the Euro and of the 
EU as a whole. 
 
5. Elections and Choice 
Schattschneider wrote in 1975 that “[t]he 
definition of the alternatives is the supreme 
instrument of power” (1975: 68). The Eu-
ropean sovereign debt crisis is a good illus-
tration of that. Choice is being artificially 
reduced to two alternatives by those who 
hold positions of power: austerity or eco-
nomic meltdown, Euro/EU or cha-
os/anarchy. According to this view, rejec-
tion of the MoU falls into the second cate-
gory, economic meltdown and anarchy. 
This reduction serves a double purpose. On 
the one hand, it shrinks the policy space to 
its minimal expression. One of the alterna-
tives is so uncertain and its consequences 
are assumed to be so costly, both political-
ly and economically, that, as a matter of 
fact, the choice is reduced to just one alter-
native: austerity. It is a way of transform-
ing a clear positional issue, austerity versus 
fiscal expansion, into a valence issue (most 
people prefer austerity over chaos). On the 
other hand, it serves to delegitimize as irre-
sponsible and populist all those political 
parties and social movements that believe 
that there is an alternative to austerity. 
(Notice, by the way, how populism is nev-
er applied to Merkel’s policy of extreme 
responsiveness at home at the expense of 
putting at risk the Euro). 
Alternation in office cannot produce policy 
change in countries under MoU rules. Be-
fore the MoU, GIIPS Governments imple-
mented the austerity package by their own 
initiative, sometimes willingly, as when 
right-wing parties were in office; other 
times under a lot of pressure by EU part-
ners and institutions, as when left-wing 
parties were in office. After signing the 
MoU, GIIPS Governments are committed 
by the agreement to apply austerity irre-
spective of ideology.  
Mainstream Left and Right parties that stick 
to this artificial reduction of the alternatives 
have seen their vote shares dramatically re-
duced. Unfortunately for the European pro-
ject, the pressure on most GIIPS Govern-
ments is coming from social movements and 
radical parties, right and left, that are increas-
ingly –if not outright– Eurosceptic. Parties 
are emerging and growing that claim to rep-
resent the people against a corrupt elite made 
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up of an alliance of politicians and bankers. 
Among the favourite targets of this anti-
elitism are Brussels’ bureaucrats although, as 
Schelkle rightly puts it, “it would be more 
pertinent to blame national democracies’ 
imposition on each other for the diktat” 
(2012: 154). These parties’ platforms claim 
for more and better democracy, for political 
regeneration. Their pledge as defenders of 
democracy is credible in the eyes of an in-
creasing number of voters in bailed-out 
countries, for they are the only ones who 
openly criticize the primacy of economic 
interests over the fate of whole societies. In a 
way a déjà vu from the time of European 
negotiations over foundation, accession and 
economic union, the extreme right complains 
about the sovereignty loss of the nation-state 
vis-à-vis the EU institutions while the radical 
left emphasizes the sovereignty loss of the 
people vis-à-vis the financial markets. 
The mainstream Left and Right are so dis-
credited now in Greece that their combined 
vote share has fallen from 77% in 2009 to 
32% in 2012. The implication is that if 
they want to be in office they have to share 
power, they have to engage in grand coali-
tion tactics. In Italy the grand coalition 
between the left-wing PD and the right-
wing PDL is a fact since March 2013. The 
PD lost eight percentage points in the elec-
tions and the PDL fell by sixteen points. 
With these results there was no alternative 
but to govern together. In Spain, the main-
stream Left is extremely discredited, hav-
ing lost 15% of its vote share between 
2008 and 2011. Now is the turn of the 
Right's discredit, with the vote intention 
for the PP as low as 22.5%, according to 
the survey by Metroscopia for El País 
(11.5.2013), and even lower, 12.5%, ac-
cording to the CIS Barometer (nº 2984, 
April 2013). Unless the economic situation 
improves in the next three years, Spain is 
heading towards a Greek scenario, both 
mainstream parties losing dramatically and 
simultaneously. Portugal is not different. 
The Socialist Party (PS) has already dis-
credited itself and in the 2011 general elec-
tion lost eight percentage points. The in-
cumbent right-wing PSD is unable to im-
prove the situation with its pro-cyclical 
policies. The summer of 2013 has seen a 
crisis of government due to internal disa-
greements in the governing coalition about 
the way to implement the MoU agreement. 
During the crisis, the Portuguese President 
made a plea to the parties in office and in 
opposition to work together in a grand coa-
lition to get out of the crisis. The Irish in-
cumbent parties have not escaped the polit-
ical earthquake of the crisis. In the parlia-
mentary election of February 2011, Fianna 
Fáil, a party that seemed “almost irremov-
able from office” (Ó Muineacháin and 
Gallgher 2008: 154), lost twenty-four per-
centage points and slipped to the third 
place in terms of vote and seat share for the 
first time since 1932. The structure of the 
party system, fairly constant for the last 
eighty years, was totally realigned. “The 
dominant axes of differentiation between 
the largest and second-largest parties in the 
Dáil became a left-right one rather than the 
traditional centre-periphery cleavage that 
had separated FF and FG for nearly eighty 
years” (Hutcheson 2011: 11). The Labour 
party obtained its highest ever proportion 
of first preference votes and seats. Another 
winner of the election was Sinn Féin, 
which campaigned in favour of repudiating 
the MoU agreement (Hutcheson 2011). 
The mainstream Right and Left still come 
first at the ballot box because thus far the 
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opponents of austerity agree on nothing but 
their opposition to it and, therefore, it is dif-
ficult to find a way to put together an alterna-
tive coalition that beats the austerity agenda 
(Rosanvallon 2008). But the tide is turning. 
New parties to the left and to the right of the 
mainstream Left and Right are growing, 
quite substantially in Greece (the fascist 
Golden Dawn and the radical left Syriza) and 
Italy (Movimento Cinque Stelle). In Greece 
in 2012, Syriza obtained 16.78% of the vote, 
coming second to Nea Demokratia 
(18.85%), the Pyrrhic winner of the election. 
Similarly, in Italy, Beppe Grillo’s M5S was 
the most voted party in the last general elec-
tion of February 2013, with 25.5% of the 
votes. The Partito Democratico obtained 
25.4%, although the left-wing coalition sur-
passed M5S by four percentage points 
(29.5%) thereby obtaining the majority prize 
of the Italian electoral system. The common 
feature of these parties is their rejection of 
the MoU and their consideration of Euro-exit 
as something that is at least worth talking 
about. These radical parties do not accept the 
TINA predicament that is so popular among 
European non-elected technocrats and 
among some European chancelleries and 
publics. 
Ultimately, the ability to implement a fis-
cal adjustment program depends on peo-
ple’s willingness to tolerate it. These pro-
grams demand drastic changes in a short 
period of time and the longer they go with-
out improving the economic situation of 
citizens, the more difficult it is for gov-
ernments to call on society’s support for -
and patience with- austerity. The imposi-
tion of austerity has broken the link be-
tween citizens’ demands and governments' 
performance. Increasingly, new parties and 
movements are representing this gap in 
terms of 'us' against 'them', the people 
against the elite, the people against Europe, 
and the irony is that, with their decisions, 
elected European Governments are render-
ing credible this depiction. The situation is 
inherently unstable, for it is unlikely that 
mainstream parties will be willing to 
commit political suicide election after elec-
tion. 
 
6. The unfolding democratic breach in the EU 
What are the consequences for democracy, 
if any, of the enormous breach inside the 
Eurozone between creditors and debtors, 
strong and fragile economies? According 
to Panagiotarea, the debt crisis “has be-
come a crisis of trust” (2013: 173). Euro-
barometer data show that she is right. Citi-
zens in debt-ridden countries have com-
pletely lost trust in the institutions of polit-
ical representation, both national and Eu-
ropean. Trust in non-elected European in-
stitutions such as the Commission and the 
ECB have also lost the confidence of Eu-
ropeans from the Eurozone periphery. 
More worryingly still, satisfaction with the 
way national and European democracy 
works has also sharply declined. This crisis 
of trust, however, has not affected core 
democracies.  
In order to see this, let us look at Euroba-
rometer data between 2002 and 2013. I 
have grouped Eurozone countries into two 
non-exhaustive categories: on the one 
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hand, GIIPS countries; on the other hand, 
the Eurozone core country Germany and 
its pro-austerity allies (Finland, Nether-
lands and Austria). The figures presented 
are averages for each group. Figures 1 to 4 
show the evolution of trust in national in-
stitutions (government, parliament and 
parties) and of satisfaction with national 
democracy. Trust is measured as the per-
centage of respondents that claim to trust 
the institution. Satisfaction with democracy 
is measured as the percentage of respond-
ents that claim to be very or fairly satisfied 
with democracy. 
 
The up- and down-peaks in Figures 1 to 3 
indicate that levels of trust in representa-
tive institutions are highly affected by 
context. Proximity to elections, political 
scandals, economic and international cri-
ses are all of them factors that have a 
direct –positive or negative– effect on the 
levels of trust. Despite this “bumpy” tra-
jectory, however, Figures 1 to 3 show the 
emergence of a gap in European public 
opinion between GIIPS and core coun-
tries since the outbreak of the crisis. In 
2002, the differences in trust between 
core and periphery never amounted to 
more than 10%; ten years later there is a 
gap of 38% in trust of governments, 36% 
in trust of parliaments and 27% in trust 
of parties. This is what I call the “demo-
cratic breach”. 
 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of trust in national government, Eurobarometer 2002-2013. 
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Figure 2: Evolution of trust in national parliament, Eurobarometer 2002-2013. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Evolution of trust in political parties, Eurobarometer 2002-2013. 
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Figure 4: Evolution of satisfaction with democracy, Eurobarometer 2002-2013. 
 
 
 
The levels of trust in representative institu-
tions are in free fall in GIIPS countries. 
Parties were never highly regarded and, for 
this reason, the fall in trust for parties is the 
smallest. Trust in parties was in mid-2013 
below the 10% level: less than 1 in 10 citi-
zens trusts her national parties. Confidence 
in the national parliaments and govern-
ments has suffered a spectacular fall, par-
ticularly since the first Greek bailout in 
2010. They are now at 10%, nearly as low 
as parties. 
 
In Germany and its allies, political trust 
has remained above its 2002 levels since 
Lehman brothers filed for bankruptcy in 
September 2008. Both trust in government 
and in political parties peaked between 
September 2008 and February 2009, when 
national Governments were implementing 
anti-cyclical reforms and when member 
states' politicians were talking about the 
need to re-invent capitalism. After this 
peak in trust, levels went down in 2010 and 
2011, the years of the GIIPS bailouts, but 
grew again in 2012, particularly trust in 
political parties, which increased from 
25% in November 2011 to nearly 33% in 
June 2012 and again in June 2013. Satis-
faction with democracy has evolved in a 
similar way. It is less “bumpy” than politi-
cal trust, for it is less dependent on contex-
tual factors, but the stable tendency in the 
core and the collapse in the periphery are 
clear, as shown in Figure 4. Core countries 
have recovered and even surpassed the 
levels of political trust and satisfaction 
with the political system that they enjoyed 
ten years ago.  
 
This democratic breach finds no replica 
when we look at trust in European institu-
tions. Figures 5 to 8 show the evolution in 
the levels of trust in the European Com-
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mission, the European Central Bank, the 
European Parliament and, finally, the Eu-
ropean Union as a whole. Although there is 
a gap between core and periphery, this is 
only due to the fact that the fall in trust 
levels is taking place at a faster pace 
among GIIPS countries than among Euro-
zone core ones. Nonetheless, the trend is 
clear for both groups. Trust in European 
institutions is falling, irrespective of 
whether these institutions are representa-
tive (the European Parliament) or not. The 
most dramatic fall has been experienced by 
the European Union considered as a whole. 
Since 2010, when 1 in 2 citizens from both 
core and periphery trusted the EU, it has 
fallen to a mere 20% in the periphery and a 
35% in the core. 
 
Figure 5: Trust in the European Commission, Eurobarometer 2002-2013. 
 
 
 
Before the outbreak of the crisis, GIIPS 
citizens trusted European institutions more 
than citizens from the Eurzone core coun-
tries (with the exception of the European 
Central Bank). After 2008, this has turned 
over. The core is now more Europeanist 
than the periphery. The positive news for 
the European project is that GIIPS citizens 
still have more trust in European institu-
tions than in their own national institutions 
and that the most trusted institution among 
GIIPS citizens is the European Parliament, 
perhaps because it is the less connected, in 
the eyes of citizens, with the imposition of 
high social costs by the austerity mongers 
and their willing executors. The highest of 
these costs is unemployment and its ac-
companying effects: poverty and exclu-
sion. According to Eurostat, between 2008 
and 2013 unemployment has increased in 
Greece by 19.3 points to 27.6, in Spain by 
16.9 points to 26.3, in Portugal by 7.8 
points to 16.5 and in Ireland by 7.4 points 
to 13.8. As Roth et al. (2013) have demon-
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strated, these unsustainable levels of un-
employment are the factors that best ex-
plain the fall of trust in national and Euro-
pean institutions. 
 
Figure 6: Trust in the European Central Bank, Eurobarometer 2002-2013. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Trust in the European Parliament, Eurobarometer 2002-2013. 
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Figure 8: Trust in the European Union, Eurobarometer 2002-2013. 
 
 
Let us now have a closer look at Europe’s 
economic locomotive, Germany. Here, we 
find a worrying development. While trust in 
national institutions has an upward –
although bumpy– trend, trust in European 
institutions is going down (Figures 9 and 
10). The lowest levels of trust in national 
government, parliament and parties occurred 
precisely between 2002 and 2004, the period 
in which Germany was the “sick man of 
Europe”, traversing an economic recession 
that led the country to breach the Maastricht 
Treaty and that only ended with the package 
of structural reforms implemented by the 
SDP/Greens coalition known as Agenda 
2010. Since 2008, by contrast, there seems to 
be some sort of national vindication at play, 
by which German citizens reward their rep-
resentative institutions’ for the defence of 
their interests and preferences vis-à-vis other 
European partners. The year 2009 was the 
first in which the decreasing trend in vote 
shares for the combined two German 
Volkspartei (SPD and CDU-CSU), observa-
ble since the mid-1970s, has been reversed. 
In the last two general elections, 2009 and 
2013, the combined vote share of CDU and 
SDP has grown considerably, even if the 
largest part of this growth is the CDU's. 
German citizens feel represented by their 
national institutions and there is more than 
one reason why this may be so. First, mac-
roeconomic indicators are good, even ex-
tremely good in comparison to those of 
other EU countries. According to Eurostat 
data, growth returned during the second 
quartile of 2013 (0.7%) and the country 
registers the second lowest unemployment 
rate in the EU after Austria (5.4%). This is 
vindicated in Germany as the harvest of the 
Agenda 2010 reforms. Second and closely  
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Figure 9: Evolution of trust in national institutions in Germany, Eurobarometer 2002-2013. 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Only 26% percent of Germans are in favour of Eurobonds (Eurobarometer 79, July 2013), the lowest figure in 
the EU-27, followed by the British (33% in favour). By contrast, 94% of Greeks and Spaniards, 94% of Dutch 
and Austrians, 93% of Fins and 90% of French are in favour of Eurobonds.  
related to the first, the social costs of aus-
terity are not as visible in Germany as they 
are in bailed-out countries. Therefore, aus-
terity is seen as necessary because its bite 
is not yet felt at home. Third, Germans’ 
main worries are public debt and inflation  
 
(Eurobarometer 79, July 2013), for which 
austerity policies are a perfect fit. Fourth, 
Germans suffer from bailout fatigue. They 
oppose further bailouts to debtor countries 
as well as the creation of Eurobonds8 and 
the German government obliges. 
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Figure 10: Evolution of trust in European institutions in Germany, Eurobarometer 2002-2013. 
 
 
The same as we can talk of an economic 
core and periphery in the Eurozone, we can 
also talk of an emerging political core and 
periphery. Citizens in GIIPS countries 
have lost trust in representative institutions 
at all levels, national and European, and 
they are highly unsatisfied with national 
and European democracy. The debt crisis 
has given birth to a profound political cri-
sis. Citizens in Eurozone core countries, by 
contrast, have recovered trust in their na-
tional institutions while their trust in Euro-
pean institutions is decreasing. The debt 
crisis has given a push to national demo-
cratic politics at the expense of Europe and 
the European project. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
Behind the sovereign debt crisis in the Eu-
rozone hides a historical irony. Greece, 
Portugal and Spain wanted to be part of the 
EU convinced that this would protect their 
incipient democracies. At that time, 
Greece, Spain and Portugal identified the 
EU with everything they did not have: sta-
ble democracies, economic prosperity and 
social justice. Herein lays the irony. Mem-
bership in the European Union is now un-
dermining the very same democracies it 
was supposed to stabilize. A ‘democracy 
without choices’ has been established in 
the Eurozone periphery under MoU rules 
(though even countries that have not 
signed a MoU yet, such as Italy, are hardly 
pressed to follow austerity). This is so be-
cause alternation in office cannot and does 
not produce policy change. Elected gov-
ernments are neither free to choose among 
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economic policy alternatives nor strong 
enough to force their Eurozone partners 
into a change of gear. As a result, all GIIPS 
Governments have left to decide is the de-
tails of the cuts and how they are going to 
deal with street opposition. GIIPS democ-
racies are on stand-by, waiting for ‘poli-
tics’ to do its job. Elections continue to be 
free and fair and alternatives to MoU (or to 
austerity) have been offered by smaller –
old and new– parties to the GIIPS elec-
torates. Therefore, there is still hope that 
democracy, paraphrasing De Tocqueville, 
will retrieve from its own mistakes. 
A counter-argument could be that Gov-
ernments’ lack of choice is not a product of 
the crisis. The reduction of choice has been 
part of the EU institutional design at least 
since Maastricht and complains about it 
were only marginal. A majority of the Eu-
ropean publics, particularly in GIIPS coun-
tries, went along with it and even celebrat-
ed it. This is a fair point. As I have said 
from the start, the absence of choice in 
GIIPS countries has been self-inflicted 
with unblemished democratic procedures 
(all EU treaties and agreements were ap-
proved either by the national parliaments 
or via referendum). No matter how much 
GIIPS’ politicians like to frame the present 
situation as an imposition from outside, 
from foreigners, they know that they wear 
two hats and that, as EU member states, 
they are a constitutive part of those very 
institutions that are imposing austerity pol-
icies on them.  
The reduction in national Governments’ 
discretion was not resented before the 
crisis because it never before came ac-
companied by such visible, widespread 
and deep social costs. During times of 
economic growth, with low levels of 
unemployment and the illusion of wealth 
that came with debt-based consumption, 
the European publics did neither see nor 
feel their Governments’ lack of autono-
my. National politicians conveniently 
contributed to keep their publics igno-
rant of what was really happening. The 
neo-liberal design behind the monetary 
union was discreetly disguised by tales 
of prosperity in a globalized world. The 
reduction of choice had the blessing of 
the European demoi. Only the euro crisis 
has demonstrated the extent to which 
democratic governments have re-
nounced, in the EU case collectively 
rather than on an individual basis, to 
their autonomy vis-à-vis the markets and 
to their capacity to implement social 
policies in hard times. When the absence 
of choice causes social injustice and a 
sudden upsurge in inequality, the public 
turns against it, because it is then seen 
and felt. 
The problem of austerity for democracy 
lies more in the fact that it has enormous 
distributive effects against the majority 
of the population than in the fact that it is 
imposed on member states by EU institu-
tions. If the people were against imposi-
tion on national governments per se, they 
would have revolted a long time ago. 
What they revolt against is social injus-
tice, widespread unemployment, poverty, 
exclusion, a lost generation, concurrent 
with a rich strata getting richer and not 
facing any consequences for their irre-
sponsible behaviour, which brought 
about the financial meltdown. Let us 
think of a counterfactual for the sake of 
argument. Let us suppose that GIIPS 
Governments are captive of financial 
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interests and in reaction to the 2008 crisis 
they impose harsh austerity measures at 
home without attending to their publics’ 
widespread opposition to it. Let us fur-
ther suppose that, seeing the risk of this 
strategy for the political stability of these 
countries, and true to the European dem-
ocratic and social values, the Troika 
forces these GIIPS Governments to 
change tack and introduce fiscal expan-
sion measures that would ease the social 
costs of the crisis. Would citizens in 
GIIPS countries protest against fiscal 
expansion the way they have protested 
against austerity, even if it were equally 
imposed from outside? They probably 
would not. The problem is not imposi-
tion, for GIIPS countries are member 
states of the EU as much as any other 
country and are co-responsible of the 
decisions taken at the EU level. The 
problem is austerity and its consequences 
for social justice and eventually for the 
political stability of democracy. 
Whether a democracy without choices but 
with popular support is really a democracy 
or not is open for debate. What is sure, 
however, is that a democracy with neither 
choices nor popular support is open for 
tumult and instability. The legitimacy of 
democracy is not only based on procedure 
but also on results. When procedure (i.e., 
free and fair elections) guarantees that 
there is a chance in the future that the party 
for social justice wins, then procedure and 
social justice reinforce one another as 
sources of legitimacy. Contrarily, when 
procedure does not give a chance to social 
justice, then democracy loses legitimacy 
on both fronts, as procedure and as content. 
How can countries with levels of unem-
ployment as those of Greece and Spain 
be required to raise taxes and cut social 
transfers without endangering their re-
spective democracies has not yet been 
properly explained to the European pub-
lics neither by national nor by EU insti-
tutions. European institutions and the 
Eurozone core countries do not seem to 
worry about the political consequences 
of austerity for GIIPS democracies. 
They seem to act in the belief that insta-
bility will be short-lived and that soon 
everything will go back to normal. Even 
GIIPS Governments do not seem to wor-
ry. If they did, it is difficult to explain 
why they do not establish a united front 
against austerity in the EU. Instead, the 
economic crisis has intensified national -
and nationalist- sentiments, strategies 
and solutions while, at the same time, 
the future autonomy of national gov-
ernments has been further curtailed. 
Core Eurozone Governments are pro-
moting conditionality (to exorcise moral 
hazard) at the expense of solidarity as 
well as an inter-temporal trade-off be-
tween responsiveness now and technoc-
racy tomorrow. This oxymoronic mix-
ture of populist nationalism and neolib-
eral technocracy does not strike as a 
well-thought and consistent instrument 
to deal with the unfolding economic and 
democratic breach in Europe. National 
Governments from all EU countries 
would do well to listen to the publics of 
the EU as a whole, and not just to their 
own publics, if there is to be hope for a 
democratic EU. 
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